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During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In 
this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of 
bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a 
setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters 
by means of elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might 
lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining power vis-à-vis the lobby and to a reduction in 
his electoral accountability. On the other hand, when the time constraint is not binding, 
bicameralism might improve electoral accountability. Hence, arguments suggesting that 
bicameralism is a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators should be taken 
with due caution and the proposed unicameral reforms in US states may indeed reduce 
corruption levels among elected representatives. 
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, rampant corruption scandals and a generalized increase in the
State debt have cast dark shadows on the accountability of state legislators across the United
States.1 This has fostered a widespread debate on the e®ectiveness of current bicameral
arrangements, leading to the formulation of unicameral proposals in fourteen US states
(Rogers 1999), the two most recent ones having been put forward in California and New
York. Only the years of the great depression have witnessed a similar level of unicameral
initiatives, which culminated in the decision of Nebraska, alone among all US states, to go
unicameral in 1934. At that time, this decision was viewed with suspicion and the fear
was that Nebraska would become a `lobbyist's paradise'.2 The historical evidence, however,
shows that this fear was unfounded (Ewing 1937; Kolasa 1971; Shumate 1952), and in fact
more recent data suggest that Nebraska ranks amongst the least corrupt US states (Glaeser
and Saks 2006, Corporate Crime Reporter 2004).
The lack of conclusive evidence on the advantages of bicameralism rises the fundamental
question of whether the second chamber is a useless duplication of the ¯rst, as most uni-
cameral proposals suggest,3 or whether it serves the important purpose of increasing the
accountability of elected representatives.4 This controversy is not unique to US state legis-
latures, as shown by the ongoing constitutional debate and reforms implemented in many
1As reported by the Center for Public Integrity, over one billion dollars was spent in 2005 to lobby state
politicians. Moreover, of the 2000 investigations on public corruption undertaken by the F.B.I. in 2006,
most involve states and local o±cials (source: The New York Times May 11, 2006, F.B.I.'s Focus on Public
Corruption Includes 2,000 Investigations)
2As Madison (1788) had pointed out \... a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct
from, and dividing the power with, a ¯rst, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles
the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or
per¯dy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be su±cient"
3According to the New York unicameral bill proposal \A one house legislature will eliminate needless
duplication and delay (...); it will speed up the budget process and facilitate the adoption of timely budgets"
(source: State of New York, Bill Number A597, January 18 2005).
4Of course, bicameralism may also serve other purposes such as the representation of heterogenous in-
terests that in modern democracies are associated with geographically distinct political jurisdictions such as
for example, federal states. For a comprehensive view of bicameralism, see Tsebelis and Money (1997).
1national states.5
Do more complex legislative procedures really make lawmakers less vulnerable to lobby
pressures? What are the potential costs of such lengthy procedures? The existing literature
has identi¯ed legislative gridlock and status quo bias as the two main drawbacks of bicam-
eralism (Riker 1992, Levmore 1992, Muthoo and Shepsle 2008). At the same time, there is
growing anecdotal evidence on the frequency of `Christmas Tree' appropriations or `Walking
Around Money' (WAM). These earmarks, introduced into state budgets to support projects
put forward by politically connected institutions and organizations, are often passed under
the threat of a government shutdown if the budget is not approved by the o±cial dead-
line.6 This suggests the presence of a third potential drawback of a bicameral system: The
complexity of the legislative procedure, combined with time constraints, might make elected
representatives less accountable.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that takes explicitly
into account the role of time to assess the e®ects of the proposed reforms of bicameral state
legislatures. Interestingly, and contrary to both the conventional wisdom and the existing
literature (see in particular Diermeier and Myerson 1999), we argue that long legislative pro-
cedures { like the ones brought about by a bicameral system { may shift the balance of power
in favor of private pressure groups, making a lobby's capture of politicians easier rather than
more di±cult. In other words, our paper is able to rationalize the widespread phenomenon
of the `Chistmas Tree' earmarks, which has been the subject of much debate in the popular
press, and thus provides new arguments in support of unicameral state legislatures.
We model the law making process as a bargaining game of alternating o®ers involving
a powerful lobby and law makers. This setting allows us to explicitly consider the time
necessary to pass legislation and to analyze the role of time constraints in the form of a
¯nite number of rounds.7 In our framework, a lobby can bribe the policy maker during the
5For an overview of bicameral arrangements in national states and a cross-country empirical analysis on
bicameralism and corruption, see Testa (2009)
6For instance during the weeks preceding the approval of the 2005 New York state budget, it has been
pointed out that \...winning on time passage from the legislature could be costly.... It might require Mr.
Pataki to agree to hundreds of millions of dollars in extra spending" (The Calendar vs. the Purse for Albany's
Big 3 The New York Times, March 16 2005). Notice that for most US federal states failure to approve the
budget by the mandated deadline often implies a complete government shutdown. For more details on late
budget procedures in US federal states see Eckl (1998).
7For a general analysis of time constraints in legislative bargaining in the form of ¯nite bargaining rounds
see Bernheim et al. (2006).
2legislative process, while citizens can only punish/reward him during an election called at the
end of the mandate. Comparing the e®ectiveness of unicameral and bicameral arrangements,
we ¯nd that bicameralism does not necessarily improve accountability because, by increasing
the time necessary to pass legislation, it may prevent legislators from credibly threatening the
rejection of lobby proposals to extract surplus from the interest group. Thus, when legislators
vote sequentially on a bill, an increase in the number of veto players does not necessarily make
lobbying more expensive. In contrast to Diermeier and Myerson (1999), we ¯nd that the cost
of buying legislators (the so called external hurdle factor) does not increase monotonically
with the number of legislative bodies. This result delivers an important warning on the
optimal allocation of legislative power from the point of view of voters: The fragmentation
of decision making across multiple bodies may weaken legislators, rendering lobby capture
easier. Our analysis thus provides new theoretical support for the proposed unicameral
reforms that are being discussed in many US states, highlighting the potential bene¯ts of
unicameralism when legislators operate under binding time constraints like in the case of the
yearly budget approval.
On the other hand, when time constraints are not binding, bicameralism can have a
positive e®ect on accountability depending on the alternative legislative procedures adopted.
In particular, the best bicameral system is the one in which equal decision powers are given to
the two chambers (open rule with restricted amendment rights). The system that attributes
unrestricted amendment rights to the second chamber is bad for incentives, as it is likely to
generate a status quo bias. The closed rule system { assigning proposal power to the ¯rst
legislator and veto power to the second { can instead be ranked between the two previous
alternatives.
Bicameralism is the subject of a recent, growing literature. Diermeier, Erasalan, and
Merlo (2003) and Druckman and Thies (2002) have studied the impact of multiple chambers
on the formation and stability of coalitional governments. Bradubury and Crain (2001) and
Heller (2001) have considered instead the link between bicameralism and budget de¯cit. All
these studies do not analyze the impact of parliamentary structures on accountability, which
is instead the focus of our paper.
In order to combine elections, lobbying and legislative procedures, we extend the bar-
3gaining literature8 endogenizing the identity of one of the players (the legislator), through
the introduction of an election stage.9 As in Bernheim et al. (2006), we assume that the
number of bargaining rounds is ¯nite, but di®erently from them we focus on the negotiations
taking place between lobby and legislators, rather than on bargaining among legislators. In
particular, similarly to Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Groseclose and Snyder (1996),
we assume that a lobbyist can buy the legislators' vote to obtain the implementation of a
given policy and we study how constitutional rules, a®ecting the bargaining process, have
an impact on the cost of buying legislators (external hurdle factor). However, while Dier-
meier and Myerson (1999), taking the external hurdle factor as given, primarily focus on
how legislators can manipulate the internal organization of chambers (i.e. internal hurdle
factor) to extract higher payments from lobbyists, in our work we concentrate on constitu-
tional rules themselves to ask which institutional arrangements can prevent lobbyists and
legislators from ¯nding agreements on policies that are detrimental to voters. Hence, in our
model a lobby competes with voters (rather than with other interest groups) to sway the
policy choice in its favor. Considering voters is crucial because, as it has been pointed out
by McKelvey and Riezman (1992), re-election incentives, together with the internal organi-
zation of chambers, have an important e®ect on policy outcomes. More generally, a large
body of literature has stressed the importance of electoral incentives when legislators are not
willing to compromise on (at least) some dimension of the policy space (Alesina 1988, Besley
and Coate 1997, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Osborne and Slivinski 1996), and there is
substantial empirical evidence supporting the view that elected o±cials pursue ideological
goals (Ansolabehere et al. 2001, Levitt 1996, Poole and Rosenthal 1996).10 Hence, in a set-
ting where legislators value re-election as a tool to implement their own ideological agenda,
our analysis highlights how di®erent parliamentary arrangements can provide incentives to
ideological representatives, which respond to both voters and lobbyists. Furthermore, by
providing a theoretical framework that shows how legislative rules and voting can be instru-
8See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a comprehensive survey, and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) for a
pioneering application of extensive form bargaining models to the legislative process.
9The literature on bicameral legislative bargaining typically does not incorporate elections. One exception
is Muthoo and Shepsle (2008) which lay out a model of optimal constitutional choice introducing elections
in a reduced form, i.e. without explicitly modeling the voting rule.
10Levitt (1996) ¯nds that voters' preferences, senator ideology and party line all in°uence roll call voting
of US senators, but the estimated weight of the senator own ideology in his objective function is higher than
the weight of the other two variables. For an overview of the literature on politicians' motivation in the US
context, see Jacobs and Shapiro (2000).
4mental in disciplining legislators, our approach is also very close to Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini (1997). However, we depart from their contribution in two important directions.
First, instead of a representative agent, we consider voters and legislators with heterogenous
preferences over policies. Second, we introduce lobbying as the source of the agency problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and
discusses the main assumptions. In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium under unicam-
eralism, while section 4 deals with bicameralism and accountability under both an open rule
and a closed rule setting. Section 5 o®ers concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider an economy composed of a set f1;:::;Kg of citizens indexed by k who delegate to a
citizen/policy-maker denoted by g the selection of a public project that will be executed by
a citizen/lobby l representing a ¯rm. The public project is characterized by two dimensions:




with CH > CL = 0. The type a 2 R+ of the policy is an attribute on which
individuals have di®erent preferences. We denote by ag the policy type delivered by legislator
g and by akg the direct bene¯t arising to individual k. Preferences for the policy type are
single peaked, concave and agg = max
k
akg. Hence, citizens can be ranked according to their
most preferred policy and we denote by m the median of the citizens' distribution with respect
to the policy types. As in Grossman and Helpman (1996) we assume that one dimension (the
type) is ¯xed while the other (the cost) is pliable. Therefore, the most natural interpretation
of the policy type is that it represents an ideological stance on which individuals are not
willing to compromise. A public project is then a triple p = (I;C;ag) 2 P, where P is
the set of all possible projects. For simplicity, we will indicate by p0 the degenerate case in
which no project is carried out (I = 0). If a project is instead implemented (I = 1), the
citizen/lobbyist l realizing it obtains a pro¯t ¦(C) increasing in C and a corresponding (net)
rent ¼(C) = [¦(C) ¡ C] . For simplicity, we assume that ¼(CH) = ¼ > 0 and ¼(CL) = 0.
The public policy is chosen in a game lasting for two periods t 2 f1;2g, with ± being
the discount factor between them,11 where the policy maker interacts with the median voter
11We focus on a ¯nite horizon game because it represent the most di±cult scenario for electoral account-
ability, since in the last mandate politicians do not face elections.
5and the lobby. In each period t a project pt = (I;C;ag) 2 Pt is realized, where Pt is
the set of all possible projects available at time t.12 We start by considering the case of a
parliamentary body with a single decision-maker g, which should be thought of as the ruling
majority. The timing of the game taking place between the three players (i.e. the legislator
g, the lobby l and the median voter m) is as follows. At the beginning of the ¯rst period, an
exogenously appointed legislator g initiates the legislative process to select a public project,
and the median voter m announces his voting rule. Once the process has been initiated, but
before the actual policy choice, the lobby l can \bribe" the lawmaker to a®ect his policy
decision. At the end of the ¯rst period, when the project has been realized, the median voter
observes the implemented policy and casts his vote. At the beginning of the second period,
the elected legislator initiates a new legislative process and the lobby l can again bribe him.
A project is then again chosen and the game ends. Hence, the game between legislator,
lobby and median voter consists of a sequence of bargaining and voting stages that will be
formally analyzed in the next two sections.
2.1 Lobbying
We model the lobbying activity in each period t as a bargaining game of alternating o®ers
between the lobby and the incumbent legislator. Remember that, since the\type" dimension
is ¯xed, players can only bargain to decide the cost of the project and how to share the
eventual rents.
We suppose that during each political mandate t, negotiation rounds r take place, with
r = f1;:::;ng, during which one player proposes a project cost and a share of the correspond-
ing rent to the other player, who can either accept or reject the proposal. If no agreement
is reached by the end of the mandate t, given that the legislator can implement any pol-
icy independently of the lobby, the disagreement payo®s will be determined by the policy
unilaterally chosen by the legislator.
As it seems natural, we assume that the lobby initiates the game by making the ¯rst
proposal.13 If the proposal is accepted, the bargaining ends with an agreement, while if the
12In the rest of the paper we will interchange the terms period and mandate.
13The recent corruption charges against Jack Abramo®, one of the most in°uential lobbyists in Washington,
has sparkled a worldwide debate on the large amounts of resources spent to gain in°uence on law making.
As the Washington Post (June 22, 2005) points out \(...) companies are also hiring well-placed lobbyists
6proposal is rejected, the bargaining goes to the next round. In each of the rounds r > 1
a player is randomly assigned the right to make o®ers. To describe the structure of the
game, we illustrate a portion of the extensive form in Figure 1, where N is nature. Let q
and (1 ¡ q) respectively be the probability that policy maker g and lobby group l make a
proposal at each round r > 1. Both probabilities are common knowledge among the parties
and the extreme cases where q = 0 or q = 1 represent the situations in which the lobby or the
legislator can make take-it-or-leave-it o®ers, i.e. one of the parties enjoys all the bargaining
power. Therefore, the assumption of random proposers allows us to model the relationship
between the bargaining power of the legislator and the lobby's ability to in°uence policies.
In particular, we will be able to study how institutional rules may a®ect the bargaining
power of legislators, and in which contexts the lobby will be able to exploit her ¯rst mover
advantage.
Formally, we can describe the bargaining game taking place in stage t as follows. Denoting
by T t
lg a monetary transfer from the lobby l to the legislator g; let xt
r 2 Xt = f(pt;T t
lg) :
¼(I;C) ¡ T t
lg ¸ 0g be the o®er made in round r of mandate t and let yt
r 2 fYes, Nog be









r) is the r-th round strategy that, for any history of the
game up to round r; prescribes a proposal xt
r and a response yt
r to all possible proposals by
other players. The acceptance of a proposal xt
r involves the implementation of a project pt
and the payment of the monetary transfer T t
lg = ¯t
g¼(I;C) from lobby l to legislator g, where
¯t
g is the share of the rents from the project paid to the legislator, while the share retained
by the lobby is ¯t
l = 1 ¡ ¯t
g:
The corresponding one period payo® vt
kg(:) of individual k; with k = e;g;l can then be
to go on the o®ensive and ¯nd ways to pro¯t from the many tax breaks, loosened regulations and other
government goodies that increasingly are available." In fact, professional lobbyists are usually hired for the
exclusive purpose of constantly approaching legislators to promote the interests of their clients. For more
information on the lobbying industry in the US see, for example, the reports from the Center for Responsive
Politics available at www.opensecrets.org.
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lg) = agg + ¯
t
g¼ ¡ C (4)
Throughout the paper we will focus on the situation in which citizens e and the lobby l have














































Note that, citizens have di®erent ideological preferences, while they share the same taste
on the cost dimension. We are now ready to introduce the voting stage.
2.2 Voting
For simplicity we assume that at the election stage there are only two candidates, A and
B, drawn from the set of citizens distributed according to their preferences for the policy
types a. To avoid the trivial case where one of the candidates can win the election on purely
\ideological grounds", we assume that the candidates are symmetrically located around the
median voter, so that none of them enjoys an advantage on the ideological dimension of
the policy. As a consequence, the cost dimension will be crucial in determining the result
of the elections, i.e. it is the \politically salient" characteristic as in Besley and Coate
(2003). Notice that, even if the cost C is the salient issue, the second, non pliable dimension
still plays an important role because candidates, who are ideological on one dimension, care
about re{election as a mean to achieve their most preferred ideological stance. As we will see,
ideology will a®ect in a non{trivial way the incentives provided by voters to legislators, since
the threat of a political rival with di®erent policy preferences can discipline the incumbent
9in his current policy choice.14
The reappointment of the incumbent A at the end of the ¯rst period is challenged by the
opponent B and the candidate receiving the vote of the median voter wins the election.15 We
follow Ferejohn (1986) and assume that, to reward/punish the incumbent, at the beginning
of the ¯rst period the median voter chooses a voting rule that maximizes his total utility
Vm(:;¾), given his expectations about the legislator's behavior. Furthermore, the voting rule
must be sub-game perfect, i.e. we consider only rewards/punishments that can be credibly
carried out once the ¯rst period policy has been chosen, so that the voting rule is consistent
with both retrospective and prospective voting. Hence, similarly to Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini (1997), we focus on a simple voting rule that has the property of selecting the
best possible equilibrium from the point of view of the voters and also has the advantage
of being plausible. Simple retrospective voting rules, that are widely used in the political
economy literature, receive substantial empirical support (Fiorina 1981) and their adoption
by the electorate can be thought of as the result of simple conventions due to social norms
(Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997).
Restricting our analysis to pure strategies, we de¯ne a voting rule for the median voter
m as a mapping from a policy choice p1 2 P1 to a voting decision, ¾m : P1 ! f0;1g, where
¾m = 1 means that the incumbent legislator A will be reelected by median voter m, while
¾m = 0 indicates instead that the median voter will support the challenger B.
The inter-temporal utility of each individual k; denoted by Vk, with k 2 fA;m;lg, can











































lA + (1 ¡ ¾m)v
2
lB] (10)
Since the median voter chooses a voting rule that maximizes his inter-temporal utility,
14In other words, we investigate whether non convergence to the median voter has implications for ac-
countability. Although in this paper we do not endogenize the location, there is a vast literature showing
the existence of non-convergence equilibria. See for instance Testa (2003).
15Groseclose (2007) shows that for \one and a half" dimensional preferences, i.e. preferences where voters
di®er in a standard left{right (ideological) dimension and share the same taste in a good{bad dimension, the
majority's preferences are identical to the median voter's.
10given the strategies adopted by the lobby l and the policy maker g, we can formally de¯ne
the equilibrium of the voting game as follows :
De¯nition 1 The equilibrium of the voting game is a voting rule ¾¤
m such that, given a
strategy pro¯le (°t
l;°t
g); Vm(:;¾¤;:) ¸ Vm(:;¾m;:); 8¾m 6= ¾¤
m.
With the further requirement that the strategies played in the bargaining game in each
period t satisfy subgame perfection, we are now ready to de¯ne the political equilibrium:





g ) such that:
i) (°2¤
l ;°2¤
g ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game in t = 2;
ii) ¾¤
m is an equilibrium of the voting game;
iii) (°1¤
l ;°1¤





3 A unicameral system
The analysis of a unicameral system constitutes a useful benchmark to evaluate how a
legislator responds to monetary and electoral incentives. To address this issue, we start by
characterizing the share of rents that induces him to choose the high or the low cost project.
Clearly, in the two mandates, the sharing rules that implement a high cost project will be
di®erent because the legislator faces elections at the end of the ¯rst mandate only. In the
second period, given a share ¯2
g and the two alternative policy choices p2
g;CH and p2
g;CL, the


















Therefore, any share ¯2
g ¸ CH
¼ will induce him to choose the high cost project and the
equilibrium shares will depend on the bargaining power of the players, i.e. on their right
to make o®ers.16 In the ¯rst period, the threat of losing elections might instead induce the
16Indeed, as in the standard Rubinstein game with random proposers, the equilibrium share of each player
coincides with his probability of making an o®er.
11legislator to be accountable to voters. If he chooses a low cost project, he can expect to
be rewarded by voters, while if he chooses a high cost project he can be punished by the
electorate and replaced by a challenger. As it is shown in the appendix (see result 1), it
turns out that in equilibrium the legislator is reelected if he has chosen the low cost project
or if he has decided not to carry out any project, while he is not reelected if he has chosen
the high cost project. The intuition for this result is as follows. In the last period the
incumbent's behavior does not depend on the voting rule because the game ends and he
cannot be punished or rewarded by the voters. Hence, the voting rule that maximizes the
median voter inter-temporal utility is a rule that induces the legislator to choose a policy
in the voter's interest at least in the ¯rst period. A rule that punishes the incumbent if
he chooses the worse policy for voters (p1
A;CH) and rewards him if he does not, induces the
legislator to choose the low cost policy in the ¯rst period. Note that this strategy satis¯es
sub-game perfection since it makes the median voter (weakly) better o® at any time, i.e.
before and after the ¯rst period policy has been chosen. Hence, although any other voting
strategy would give the voter the same utility in the second period, there is no alternative
voting rule that would induce a better policy choice in the ¯rst period. Therefore, similarly to
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), we adopt the Ferejohn (1986) approach that selects
the voting rule delivering the best possible equilibrium from the point of voters that, in
our case, corresponds to an equilibrium where accountability at least in one period can be
achieved. Given this equilibrium voting strategy, the two period bargaining game can be
solved by backward induction:
Lemma 1 Suppose that q¼ ¸ CH. In t = 2 the lobby and the legislator reach an agreement
in the ¯rst round of negotiation whereby the policy p2
g;CH is chosen, and the lobby l receives a
share ¯2
l = (1¡q) of the rents, while the legislator g receives a share ¯2
g = q. In t = 1; given
¯
1
A = ±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)





A;CL and every share ¯1
A ¸ ¯
1
A implements the policy choice p1
A;CH.
Proof. In t = 2;when r = n, any proposer can make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er and extract
the entire pro¯t. Legislator g makes a take-it-or leave it o®er with probability q, while the
lobby does the same with probability 1¡q, and given that v2
gg(p2
g;CH;T 2













g;CH;q¼) is reached. When r = n ¡ 1, each player is willing to accept a transfer
12that is at least equal to what they could achieve in round n by rejecting in round n ¡ 1.
Hence, again each player would propose x2
n¡1 = (p2
g;CH;q¼), which will be accepted. Moving
backward, at r = 1 the lobby o®ers x2
1 = (p2
g;CH;q¼) and g accepts. Moving now to t = 1,
notice that, given p2








0) = 1], then VA(p1
A;CH;:) = aAA + ¯1
A¼ ¡ CH + ±(aAB ¡ CH) ¸
VA(p1
A;CL;:) = aAA + ±[aAA + q¼ ¡ CH] if and only if ¯1





A = ±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ , we obtain that if ¯1
A ¸ ¯
1
A is o®ered, the incumbent A
prefers the policy p1
A;CH to the policy p1
A;CL. ¥
Note that if q¼ < CH the legislator will never be willing to choose the high cost policy.
Hence, electoral accountability is at risk only when q¼ ¸ CH. For this reason, in the rest of
the paper we will assume this restriction to hold. Regarding the ¯rst period bargaining, the
critical share ¯
1
A depends on the per capita cost CH the legislator pays in the ¯rst mandate,
the share of pro¯ts q he receives in the second mandate if he is reelected, and on the distance
between his most preferred policy type and the policy type implemented by legislator B if
he goes in power, (aAA ¡ aAB). In other words, the legislator is willing to choose the high
cost project and not be reelected if the share of the rents net of per capita costs received in
the ¯rst mandate compensates him for the electoral loss consisting in giving up future lobby
transfers, and not being able to choose his most preferred policy type.
Turning now to the lobby, since like any other citizen it has preferences for policy types,
it will not be indi®erent to the change of legislator following the implementation of the high
cost policy in the ¯rst mandate. The following lemma provides the necessary and su±cient
conditions for the lobby to prefer the high cost policy in the ¯rst period:






: x1 = (p1
A;CH;(1 ¡ ¯1
l )¼) is an equilibrium o®er in period






Proof. If in t = 1 the agreement x1 = (p1
A;CH;(1 ¡ ¯1
l )¼) is reached, the lobby ob-
tains Vl(p1
A;CH;T 1
lg;:) = alA + ¯1
l ¼ + ±(alB + ¯2
l ¼). If no agreement is reached, given that
VA(p1
A;CL;:) > VA(p1
0;:) then the legislator unilaterally chooses p1
A;CL and the the lobby ob-
tains Vl(p1
A;CL;:) = alA + ±(alA + ¯2
l ¼). Hence, Vl(p1
A;CH;T 1
lg;:) ¸ Vl(p1





We are now ready to characterize the policy choice in the ¯rst mandate in the following
13Proposition 1 During the ¯rst mandate if (aAA ¡ aAB) · 1
±
£
(1 ¡ ±q)¼ ¡ CH¤
¡(alA ¡ alB),
policy p1
A;CH is chosen, while if (aAA ¡ aAB) > 1
±
£
(1 ¡ ±q)¼ ¡ CH¤
¡(alA ¡ alB), policy p1
A;CL
is chosen.
Proof. Lemma 2 establishes that ¯1
l = ±¯
1
l is the minimum share of rents that makes the
lobby better o® by reaching an agreement x1 = (p1
A;CH;T 1




A is the minimum payment that makes the legislator (weakly) better o® by reaching
an agreement x1 = (p1
A;CH;T 1
lg). Since the lobby will pay the minimum the legislator is
willing to accept, then ¯1
A = ¯
1
A. Hence, all we need to show is that the lobby will obtain at
least a share ¯1
l = ±¯
1
l after it has paid ¯
1




l, which is true
if and only if (aAA ¡ aAB) · 1
±[(1 ¡ ±q)¼ ¡ CH] ¡ (alA ¡ alB). ¥
The condition (aAA¡aAB) · 1





and requires the feasibility of the minimum shares inducing the legislator and the lobby to
agree on p1
A;CH. The shares depend on the legislator preferences for the project type, and on
the bargaining power of the players. It is straightforward to verify that if the legislator has
the power to make a take-it-or-leave it o®er, i.e. if q = 1, and the future is not discounted
(± = 1) the minimum share inducing the incumbent to choose the high cost project is not
feasible. Therefore, when the legislator has all the bargaining power, he will be accountable
to voters. This result is summarized in
Corollary 1 Suppose that ± = 1. When the legislator makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, the
policy p1
A;CL is implemented.
Proof. If the legislator has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er and ± = 1;then he
requires ¯
1
A = 1 +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ > 1, which is not feasible. ¥
The opposite case, in which the lobby can make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er (q = 0), rep-
resents the worst case for accountability as the minimum share implementing the high cost
policy reaches the lowest value when q = 0. Note also that the polarization of the political
race has a positive e®ect on accountability. In fact, if the race is very polarized the di®erence




In this section we analyze the impact of bicameralism on electoral accountability. In par-
ticular, we explore the e®ect of alternative institutional rules (i.e. bargaining protocols)
regulating the two legislative bodies. Using a bargaining game of alternating o®ers to ana-
lyze this problem has several advantages. First, we can explicitly model the di®erent steps
of a sequential legislative process where, at each stage, legislators are allowed to take di®er-
ent actions, like vetoing or amending a proposal previously approved. Second, we are able
to acquire some important insights on the relationship between the time structure of the
legislative process and the bargaining power of legislators, which turns out to be crucial for
electoral accountability. In particular, as the bargaining power of players varies with the
con¯guration of the sequential decision making, then a given number of legislators deciding
sequentially does not, in general, deliver the same policy outcome of an identical number
of players deciding simultaneously. The consequences of the sequentiality are not trivial.
For example, di®erently from Diermeier and Myerson (1999), in an alternating o®er setting
there is no perfect equivalence between super-majority rules and approval with sequential
veto players. Similarly, a single large chamber made up by the same number of legislators
of two chambers will not produce the same outcome as a bicameral system.
How does bicameralism a®ect the lobbies' ability of buying legislators? Intuitively, intro-
ducing multiple legislators makes lobbying more costly, since more decision makers need to
be compensated for the implementation of an unpopular policy. At the same time, the cre-
ation of additional steps in the legislative process is likely to increase the time span needed
for the policy to be adopted, making it potentially di±cult to deliberate before the end
of the mandate. As a result, a somewhat counter-intuitive consequence of having multiple
chambers is that their ability to credibly threaten the rejection of a lobby's proposal to make
countero®ers might be considerably reduced because. Hence, a complex legislative structure,
besides wasting hours of legislators' time in multiple deliberative sessions, can also increase
the ability of the pressure group to in°uence the decision making process, and make the
accountability problem more severe. In what follows we will show how these forces play
out under two di®erent institutional arrangements commonly adopted in democracies, i.e.
a closed rule and an open rule system. In the former, after the ¯rst body has proposed a
policy, the other chamber only enjoys veto power. In the latter, all chambers are symmetric
15in the sense of being able to introduce amendments to the original proposal. We will carry
out the analysis in a general environment with multiple bodies, of which a bicameral system
represents a particular case. This more general set-up is useful to obtain a characterization
that can be used to analyze the e®ect of constitutional arrangements introducing additional
veto players { besides the two chambers { in the legislative process. Hence, while this paper
focusses on bicameralism, the general theoretical framework with multiple veto players can
¯nd a variety of alternative applications. For instance, it can be used to understand the role
of presidential veto power or it can be employed to evaluate provisions like the \emergency
brake" rule contained in the EU constitution draft.17
Before proceeding we need to adapt our notation to accommodate the more complex
structure of the game. To that end, suppose that the legislative process involves the sequen-
tial approval of D > 1 chambers denoted by gd with d = 1;:::;D. In each mandate t the
chamber g1 initiates the process, and lobby l starts the bargaining by making a ¯rst o®er.
If an o®er is rejected, the game goes to the next round, where the chamber can make a




lg1) be a proposal upon which an agreement has been reached by the lobby and
the ¯rst chamber, where pt
g1 2 Pt. Once the two parties have reached an agreement, the
legislation passes to the next chamber g2, with whom the lobby starts a new bargaining game
making a proposal that g2 can accept or reject. If the bargaining moves to a subsequent
round, the legislative assembly and the lobby would again make o®ers respectively with prob-
ability q and 1¡q. In case of disagreement between the lobby and a chamber, the legislative
body can always unilaterally choose his most preferred policy and then the legislation moves
again to the following chamber, with which the lobby can start bargaining. However, the
policy that each chamber can pass (and the agreement that the lobby can reach with each
legislative body) crucially depends on the allocation of legislative powers. The ¯rst chamber
that has proposal power can choose any policy pt
g1 2 Pt. As for the subsequent chambers gd,
d > 1, when they only have veto power, the feasible policy set available to legislators d > 1
is pt
g1, since they can only decide whether to ratify the policy chosen by the ¯rst chamber or
veto it. If they instead have amendment rights, the set of feasible policies coincides with Pt.
17This rule allows a member country, that has been outvoted on a proposal in Parliament, to ask for a new
vote in the Council. This is equivalent to a system where the ¯rst body (Parliament) has proposal power
and the second (Council) has ¯nal decision power.
16Let ¯t
gd be the share of the rents paid to legislator gd in period t, so that T t
lgd = ¯t
gd¼ and let
gd0 be a generic legislator, where d0 > 1. The lobby's residual pro¯t after an agreement xt
gd0
has been reached with legislator d0 are then given by ¼t
gd0 = ¼(1 ¡
Pd0
d=1 ¯t
gd) and the set of










gd0 ¡ T t
lgd0+1 ¸ 0g under open rule. Figure 2
illustrates the structure of the game under open rule. Importantly, for a policy to be imple-
mented in a multi-chamber setting, some type of deliberation by each chamber is required,
i.e. when there are D legislators at least n = D rounds of negotiations are necessary to pass
a proposal. Note that if n = D, then multiple legislators operate under binding time con-
straints because, if one of them fails to deliberate during the ¯rst round of negotiation, the
legislative process cannot be completed. When this happens, a default policy, di®erent from
the most preferred one, will be implemented. For simplicity, and without loss of generality,
we assume that the default is the no policy option p0.18
The one period payo® to the various agents are analogous to those reported in equations















g;C;Tlg1;:::;TlgD) = agg + ¯
t
gd¼ ¡ C (12)
For simplicity, we rule out the possibility of divided government in our model, assuming
that all legislators belong to the same party.19 As a result, a voting strategy for the median
voter m is a mapping ¾m : P1 ! f0;1g where ¾m = 1 indicates that all the legislators
f1;:::;Dg belonging to party A will be reelected, while ¾m = 0 means instead that the
median voter will cast his ballot in favor of party B. Then Vk, the inter-temporal utility of
18Indeed, in the approval of the US states budgets, if the two chambers fail to reach a deliberation by the
o±cial deadline, most states operate under legal provisions according to which money cannot be paid from
the state treasury without an appropriation. This implies a complete government shut down if a budget has
not been not enacted. For more details on late budget procedures see Eckl (1998).
19Although in most bicameral systems the two chambers have the same type of majority, divided chambers
are not uncommon for example in the US Congress. A companion paper, Testa (2003), shows how divided
government decreases electoral accountability.
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Figure 2: Open rule Multi-cameralism



















lA + (1 ¡ ¾m)v
2
lB] (15)
We are now ready to introduce the political equilibrium. For the voting game, we can use
the previous de¯nition.20 Concerning the lobbying, we now have a sequence of bargaining
games between l and gd within each mandate t. Hence, for subgame perfection to hold, in
t = 2 we must require that the strategies played by l and gd in the game starting in r are
subgame perfect given not only any strategy played by l and gd in their future rounds of
negotiation, but also given any strategies played by l and successive legislators gd+1 in every
subsequent bargaining game taking place within the same mandate. In t = 1, on the other
hand, we must take into account not only the strategies played in every future round within
that period, but also the voting strategy played by the median voter at the and of the ¯rst




gd ) be a pair of strategies played by legislator gd and lobby l in the bargaining game
beginning in r, with r ¸ 1 and d ¸ 1 and let r + s with s ¸ 1 denote all future possible
rounds within a mandate t. Formally, we require the following :
De¯nition 3 A strategy pair (°
2;r¤
l ;°2;r¤
gd ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining
game starting in round r of mandate t = 2 between l and gd if the strategy pair it induces in





De¯nition 4 A strategy pair (°
1;r¤
l ;°1;r¤
gd ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargain-
ing game starting in n round r of mandate t = 1 between l and gd if the strategy pair it








20The only di®erence here is that the median voter chooses a voting strategy maximizing Vm(:) given a






gd ) of the ¯rst and second period bargaining games between
l and gd.












gd ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of each second period bargaining game be-
tween l and gd beginning in r;
ii) ¾¤




gd ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium each ¯rst period bargaining game between
l and gd beginning in r.
4.1 Closed rule
We begin our analysis by considering the case where the ¯rst legislator has proposal power
and the subsequent legislators can only pass or veto previously approved proposals. The
pro¯t shares that legislators are able to extract bargaining with the lobby depend in a
fundamental way on their ability to credibly threaten the rejection of the lobby's proposal
and also on the type of policy decision they can undertake (i.e. whether they can propose
a policy or can only approve or veto an existing proposal). Since in a strategic bargaining
context the time available to negotiate is crucial for the rejection of proposals to be a credible
threat, the length of the legislative process can have an important e®ect on the bargaining
power of legislators. When the time available for lawmaking is limited, so that the rejection
of the lobby's proposal will result in the inability to pass a bill, the bargaining power of
multiple legislators can be seriously limited, and time constraints are obviously more likely
to be binding the higher the number of legislative bodies that need to deliberate in a given
time span. As for the legislators' institutional rights, under closed ruled, the ¯rst legislator
enjoys a substantial advantage that should be re°ected in the extraction of a higher pro¯t
share than the subsequent ones. These intuitive arguments are formalized in
Lemma 3 The following holds:
i) Suppose that D = n ¡ k, with k ¸ 1. In t = 2 and r = 1, p2
g;CH is chosen and ¯2
g1 = q,
while ¯2












¼ 8d > 1.
20ii) Suppose that D = n. In t = 2 and r = 1, p2

















¼ 8d > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous lemma illustrates two important points. First, it shows how the distribution
of proposal and veto powers has an impact on the cost of buying each chamber. Second, it
establishes how the number of negotiation rounds, by a®ecting the ability of legislators to
credibly threaten the rejection of the lobby's proposal, in°uences the cost of lobbying. As we
can see from the second period minimum pro¯t shares obtained by the various players, the
¯rst legislator can extract a positive share, provided that the number of rounds is su±ciently
large for him to make at least one counter-o®er with probability q. On the other hand, the
subsequent legislators, enjoying only veto power, cannot extract any positive lobby's payment
since vetoing a proposal gives them a lower pay-o® than approving any proposal passed by
the ¯rst legislator. The pro¯t shares in the second mandate have in turn an impact on their
¯rst period counterparts. Similarly to the unicameral case, legislators require a minimum
transfer that should compensate them for the \policy loss" and \pro¯t loss" they would incur
in the second period by pleasing the lobby rather than the electorate. As a consequence,
legislators enjoying only veto power demand a minimum share that only compensates them
for the potential \policy loss", since in the second period they cannot obtain any pro¯t.
On the other hand, the ¯rst legislator requires compensation for both the future \policy
loss" and \pro¯t loss". Clearly, the second period pro¯t loss of the ¯rst chamber depends
on its bargaining power, which in turn depends on the time available to negotiate. In
particular, when time constraints are not binding (n > D = n ¡ k), the ¯rst chamber can
credibly threaten to reject the ¯rst lobby o®er since the time horizon allows it to make at
least a counter-o®er with probability q. On the other hand, with binding time constraints
(D = n) the ¯rst legislator looses the right to make counter-o®ers, because a rejection of
the ¯rst lobby's proposal will result in a failure to approve any legislation by the end of the
mandate.21 This situation might well occur when o±cial deadlines to pass a legislation are
in place, like in the case of the annual budget process in the US federal states.22
21 In other words, when the number of negotiation rounds is su±ciently big (D = n¡k), the lobby looses
her ¯rst mover advantage, while this is not the case for D = n.
22For an overview of budgetary deadlines and procedures in the US states see NASBO (2002).
21Note that, when the time constraints are not binding (i.e. D < n), the ¯rst legislators





A). Given that all subsequent legislators require a non-negative share,23 then the
total share of rents received by policymakers in the multi-chamber context cannot be smaller








in this case, the cost of lobbying increases monotonically with the number of legislators.24
On the other hand, under binding time constraints (D = n), the loss of bargaining power
for the ¯rst legislator (implying a smaller minimum share than a legislator operating under
unicameralism) constitutes an important drawback of a multi-chamber system, which can
work against the interest of the electorate. In this case, we can establish the following non
monotonicity result:
Lemma 4 Suppose that D = n. If (D ¡ 1)[±(aAA ¡ aAB) + CH ¡ aAA] < ±(q¼ ¡ CH), then
the share of rents paid to a single legislator is bigger than the sum of the shares paid to D
legislators, while the opposite holds if (D ¡ 1)[±(aAA ¡ aAB) + CH ¡ aAA] ¸ ±(q¼ ¡ CH):
Proof. When D = n, since ¯
1



















A , (D¡1)[±(aAA¡aAB)+CH¡aAA] ·
±(q¼ ¡ CH).
Intuitively, the total transfer required by legislators to compensate the \policy compo-
nent" of their electoral loss (ideological loss and high per capita cost) increases as more
lawmakers need to be payed o®.25 On the other hand, the compensation for the loss of
future lobby transfers required by the ¯rst legislator decreases because of its inability to
credibly reject a lobby proposal given the binding time constraints. Hence, only when the
increase in the policy component of the electoral loss more than compensates the decrease
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24We focus on the cost of lobbying deriving from the electoral loss of multiple legislators because we are
mainly interested in electoral incentives. However, it should be clear that having multiple chambers deciding
sequentially rather than simultaneously can have a substantial impact on the lobby's ability to bribe the
legislator whenever lobbying is a costly, time consuming activity or the rents associated to from an agreement
decrease with time. Hence, our results on the positive e®ect of bicameralism on accountability hold a fortiori
if we introduce either a cost of lobbying or a pro¯t that are time dependent.
25The electoral loss is equal to [±(aAA ¡ aAB) + CH] for the legislator with proposal power and ±[(aAA ¡
aAB) + CH] + C
H¡aAA
¼ for the legislators with only veto power:
22in bargaining power, the cost of lobbying increases with the number of legislator making
multiple chambers potentially more accountable to voters. The non monotonic relationship
between accountability and the number of legislators pointed out in lemma 4 contrasts with
the ¯ndings of Diermeier and Myerson (1999), where the so called external hurdle factor26
increases monotonically with the number of decision makers. Thus, our result points out a
drawback of increasing the number of legislative bodies and provides a potential rationale
for current reform proposals aiming for shorter and simpler legislative procedures in US fed-
eral states. However, to obtain some interesting predictions on reforms and accountability,
we ¯rst need to establish some comparative results on the policy choices under alternative
legislative procedures.
To keep the characterization of the policy choice as simple as possible, from now on we





¼ < 0, an increase in the number of legislators does not
a®ect accountability since they require a zero minimum pro¯t share. For this reason, in the








A;n be the sum of the minimum rent shares D legislators are willing to accept to
implement p1
A;CH when D = n, and let ¯
1
A;n¡k be the sum of the minimum shares required
when D = n ¡ k;k ¸ 1: The next result fully characterizes the conditions under which
legislators choosing the low cost policy are accountable to voters and choosing the high cost
are not:
Theorem 1 The following holds:









A > 1 then legislators are always accountable. If instead ¯
1
A < 1 <
¯
1
A;n¡k then legislators are accountable under multicameral arrangements only.













A > 1, they are always accountable. Finally, if ¯
1
A;n <
26Expressing the di±culty of buying legislators.
27This implies that the condition ¯1
l ¸ ±¯
1
l derived in lemma 2 is always satis¯ed.
231 < ¯
1
A then legislators are accountable under a unicameral arrangement only, while if
¯
1
A < 1 < ¯
1
A;n they are accountable only under multicameral ones.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the theorem we obtain a number of important insights on the relative e®ectiveness of
unicameralism and multi-cameralism with respect to electoral accountability. Interestingly,
while under several parameter's con¯gurations the two systems deliver the same policy out-
comes, there are two cases where one type of legislative arrangement can be clearly ranked
above the other in terms of electoral accountability. When the minimum rent share legis-
lators are willing to accept under unicameralism is feasible and inferior to the non-feasible
share under bicameralism (¯
1
A < 1 < ¯
1
A;n¡k), then we have the traditional Madisonian ar-
gument in favor of bicameralism, i.e. that while one chamber can be easily corrupted, the
cost of buying two chambers is so high that accountability can be achieved. However, this
outcome is possible only insofar as multiple legislators retain bargaining power. Hence, when
binding time constraints do not to allow chambers to extract rents by credibly threatening
the rejection of a lobby proposal, then bicameralism will in fact have an opposite e®ect on
accountability. By increasing the time necessary to pass legislation, a bicameral system can
decrease the minimum rent shares legislators are willing to accept up to the point where
multiple chambers can be bought by the lobby while a single one remains accountable to the
electorate (¯
1
A;n < 1 < ¯
1
A). Hence, our model delivers an important caveat on adding multi-
ple legislative steps in the law making process, since long and complex legislative procedures
may ultimately weaken legislators and hurt voters. This result provides an important ratio-
nale for the unicameral proposals currently being discussed in several US states advocating
the abolition of time consuming legislative procedures. While those proposals just point
out that abolishing redundant legislative sessions will save hours of wasted legislators' time,
our analysis uncovers that there is a more profound meaning to the \value of time " in a
legislative process since an extended time horizon for lawmaking can increase the bargaining
power of parliamentary bodies as well as their electoral accountability.
4.2 Open rule
When amendment rights are ruled out, the power to choose the content of the new legislation
is given entirely to the chamber initiating the process, while the following legislators can
24only decide whether to approve or not the initial proposal. If amendment rights are instead
introduced, the subsequent legislators can actually modify the original policy. Since the ¯rst
chamber will anticipate this possibility, the existence of amendment rights is likely to have
an important e®ect, and to analyze it we concentrate for simplicity on the case where all D
legislators have the possibility to make at least one counter-o®er (i.e. n ¸ 2D). We consider
both the case of unrestricted amendment rights, i.e. the situation in which the policy passed
by the previous chamber can unilaterally be modi¯ed by the subsequent legislators, and
the situation in which the amendments introduced require the approval of all legislators
(restricted amendment rights). In both cases, chambers d > 1 can only amend a legislative
proposal passed by the ¯rst chamber, or in other words, they do not have the power to
initiate the legislative process.28 If no legislation is passed in the ¯rst chamber, then the
mandate ends with no policy being implemented.
The following lemma characterizes the ¯rst and second period minimum pro¯t shares
required to implement the high cost policy under restricted and unrestricted amendment
rights. Let ¯
1
gd = R±q(1¡q)d¡1 +g(d;R)±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ be the minimum payment that
each legislator gd is willing to accept in order to implement p1
A;CH under restricted (R = 1)
or unrestricted (R = 0) amendment rights, where g(d;1) = 0 8d, g(d;0) = 0 8d < D and
g(d;0) = 1 if d = D. The following holds:
Lemma 5 Suppose that q(1 ¡ q)D¡1 ¸ CH
¼ . In period t = 2 during the ¯rst round of
negotiations the policy p2
A;CH is chosen and each legislator obtains ¯2
gd = Rq (1 ¡ q)
d¡1 +
g(d;R)±q where d = 1;:::;D: In period t = 1 the minimum share required by each legislator
gd to choose policy p1
A;CH is ¯
1
gd = R±q(1 ¡ q)d¡1 + g(d;R)±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ 8d ¸ 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is important to remark that under restricted amendment rights (R = 1), every cham-
ber requires in the second period a positive share of the lobby pro¯t, since they all enjoy
some bargaining power as they have the same amendment rights. These ¯ndings are very
di®erent from the closed rule system, where in the second mandate the ¯rst legislator only,
enjoying proposal power, can require a positive rent.29 On the other hand, with unrestricted
28This type of arrangement is very common. For instance, in the US only the House of Representatives
can initiate budget legislation.
29As we can see, under restricted amendment rights, the ¯rst legislator receives ¯2
g1 = q as in the closed
25amendment rights (R = 0), the sum of the shares paid to the legislators is identical to the
closed rule case, but the power of the legislators is reversed. In fact, the last legislator, rather
than the ¯rst, is now in the position to extract a positive pro¯t share in the second period.
Given these di®erences due to alternative allocations of proposal powers, we can establish
some interesting comparative results between open and closed rules systems. Since in the
second term the policy p2
g;CH is always carried out, we focus on the ¯rst period policy choice.
The next theorem summarizes our main ¯ndings:
Theorem 2 The following holds
i) Suppose that amendment rights are restricted (R = 1). If the low cost policy is chosen
under closed rule then the low cost policy is chosen also under open rule, while the
reverse is not true.
ii) Suppose that amendment rights are unrestricted (R = 0). If the low cost is chosen under
open rule than the same policy is also chosen under closed rule, while the reverse is not








A < 1, then the low cost policy is
chosen under closed rule, while the status quo policy (p1
0) is implemented under open
rule.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the ¯rst part of the theorem is quite straightforward. When amendment
rights are restricted, the total share to be paid to legislators to obtain the high cost policy is
always higher than under closed rule (lemma 5). Hence, if the total share under closed rule
is feasible, while the total share under open rule is not, legislators who are not accountable
under closed rule become accountable under open rule. However, if amendment rights are
unrestricted, then the implications in terms of accountability are di®erent. Interestingly,
when the lobby can a®ord to pay only the most powerful individual legislator, under open
rule the status quo (p1
0) is implemented, while in the closed rule setting the low cost policy
would be chosen. In other words, when the ¯nal legislator can unilaterally change a previously
rule case, but all subsequent legislators d > 1 receive ¯2
gd = q (1 ¡ q)
d¡1, while under closed rule ¯2
gd = 0
for all d > 1 (see lemma 3). One might wonder if these results would continue to hold in a di®erent model,
where the lobby can use strategic delays to reduce the legislators' ability of making counter{o®ers. As long
as players are su±ciently impatient, our results still carry through, i.e. the lobby in the second mandate has
to pay all legislators to obtain the low cost policy.
26approved proposal, a status quo bias arises because the ¯rst legislator prefers not approving
a policy proposal rather than passing a low cost policy that can be amended to high cost
by the last bribed decision maker. The problem of the potential status quo bias associated
with multiple legislators has been stressed by other authors.30 However, di®erently from
the existing literature, our analysis emphasizes that this risk is real only when subsequent
legislators are given more power than the ¯rst one, as in the case of unrestricted amendment
rights. On the other hand, if amendment rights are restricted, then situations of legislative
impasse can be avoided and an open rule bicameralism becomes an e®ective instrument to
improve accountability. This factor seems to have been taken into account in the design of
many legislative bodies around the world, in which amendments implemented by the second
chamber need to be approved by the ¯rst chamber as well.31
To complete our discussion of bicameralism and accountability, we would like to brie°y
consider another example in which bicameralism turns out to be neutral. Suppose that for
a given economic environment, the policy preferred by the lobby is the status quo, while the
voters prefer instead a di®erent policy. In this case, with a bicameral system, voters need the
approval of two legislative bodies to see the implementation of their preferred policy, while
the lobby will be satis¯ed just by the negative decision of one chamber. It is then clear that
the existence of a second legislator does not have any e®ect since the cost of lobbying does
not change compared to the one chamber case. In other words, policy choices implemented
by negative decisions are \cheaper" to buy than policy choices requiring a positive decision.
Therefore, if the lobby supports the status quo, increasing the number of legislators does not
help solving the accountability problem.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a theoretical framework to analyze the e®ects of bicam-
eralism on lawmakers' accountability to the public. In particular, inspired by the current
30See for instance Tsebelis and Money (1997).
31In most countries, this means that the text of a bill needs to be approved in the same form by both
legislative bodies. Hence, in case of disagreement, the bill shuttles between the two chambers until an
agreement is reached. However, in extreme cases of complete parliamentary deadlock, other mechanisms
have been devised. For instance, in the US a conference committee can be called where delegates from each
chamber meet to ¯nd a compromise. For more details see Tsebelis and Money (1997).
27debate on constitutional reform in several US states, we have considered how the number of
chambers in a parliament and the allocation of powers among them can discipline elected
representatives and limit the ability of pressure groups to buy in°uence. To that end, we
have built a model in which legislators interact with a lobby group through a bargaining
process, and with voters by means of elections.
Our analysis delivers two important messages that should be taken into account in design-
ing reforms of the legislative process. First, the greater complexity induced by an additional
chamber may come with an undesirable e®ect, i.e. the loss of bargaining power for the elected
body vis-µ a-vis the lobby. Additional steps increase the time necessary to pass legislation.
Hence, when the chambers have limited time to deliberate, legislators might not be able to
credibly threaten the rejection of a lobby's proposal to extract rents. When this happens,
bicameralism might well have a detrimental e®ect on accountability. On the other hand, if
time constraints are not binding, a larger number of legislative bodies may increase the cost
of lobbying and, therefore, enhance electoral accountability. If this is the case, the second
important message of our analysis is that the e®ectiveness of a bicameral system crucially
depends on the rules governing the two elected bodies, and in particular the allocation of the
decision power between the chambers. For accountability purposes, the best incentives are
provided whenever two legislative bodies share equal decision powers (i.e. restricted amend-
ment rights). Having instead unrestricted amendment rights can result in a status quo bias,
whereby no new legislation is passed.
The debate on the e®ectiveness of bicameral as opposed to unicameral arrangements is
not unique to US state legislatures. National states such as Germany and Italy have been
considering reforms of their parliamentary bodies to reduce the power of the senate, whereas
the UK proposal to render the Lords an elected body with substantive legislative powers
pushed in the opposite direction. The role of the council of states in the European Union
and its potential to act as a second chamber, in addition to the existing parliament, is also
one of the many controversial issues surrounding the drafting of the EU constitution. How far
can we go in applying our analysis of bicameralism to these alternative contexts? Di®erently
from sub-national state legislatures, national and federal legislative bodies, besides the yearly
budget approval, often deal with matters of constitutional relevance or important reforms
of general interest, for which time constraints are typically not binding. In this case a more
complex process does not translate in more lobby capture, while the scrutiny by two bodies
28can provide better expertise and more careful deliberation. Thus, if bicameralism is to
be advantageous, its role could be con¯ned to matters of general interest for which timely
deliberations are not a priority. More research is necessary though to formally establish how
di®erent tasks should be allocated to decision-makers.
6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium Voting Strategy







0) = 1] is an equilibrium
voting strategy, i.e. Vm(:;¾¤
m) ¸ Vm(:;¾m) 8¾m 6= ¾¤
m.
Proof. Since the voting decision depends only on the policy outcome, the same argument
applies for a single as well as for multiple legislators. This proof is therefore carried out
for the more general situation in which we have D legislators. Notice that in the second
period p2
A;CH is chosen under any legislative procedure and given any voting rule. Hence,
we conclude that to show whether Vm(:;¾¤
m) ¸ Vm(:;¾m), we only need to analyze the ¯rst
period payo® v1



















A;CH is the policy preferred by any legislator receiving ¯gd ¸ 0, since he can
receive lobby transfers and choose his most preferred policy in both periods. On the other
hand, under the voting strategy ¾¤
m depending on the parameters of the model, either p1
A;CH
or p1
A;CL can be implemented. Notice that from propositions 1 { 6, when the policy p1
A;CH
is chosen then Vm(:;¾1
m) = Vm(;¾¤




m): Hence, we conclude that Vm(:;¾1
m) · Vm(;¾¤
m) and therefore ¾1
m
















Under the voting rule ¾2
m the incumbent is never reappointed. Therefore, since p1
A;CH gener-
ates a higher net pro¯t to be shared, Vgd(p1
A;CH) ¸ Vgd(p1
A;CL) 8¯1
gd ¸ 0, which implies that
p1
A;CH will always be chosen. Hence, as in the previous case, ¾2






















0) for all d, when legislators do not receive transfers from the
lobby, they always prefer to implement p1
A;CL, i.e. p1
A;CL is their outside option. Since
when o®ered transfers legislators choose between p1




0) = 0 is irrelevant except for the unrestricted amendment rights case,
where p1
0 can be an outside option. Remember that with unrestricted amendment rights,
given ¾¤
m, we know that if ±q + D[
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ ] > 1 but ±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ < 1, then
for ± ¸ ^ ±, Vg1(p1
0) > Vg1(p1
g1;CL) and p1
0 is chosen to prevent the ¯nal implementation of
p1
gD;CHHowever, under ¾3
m because of the punishment ¾3
m(p1
0) = 0, for the ¯rst legislator the
following holds: Vg1(p1
A;CL) = aAA ¡ CH + ±(aAB ¡ CH) > Vg1(p1
0) = ±(aAB ¡ CH). Hence,
the ¯rst legislator chooses (p1
A;CL) and the last legislator amends it passing (p1
A;CH). Since











































































6.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In t = 2 the following holds. For D = n ¡ k, the ¯rst legislator gd has the power
to make at least one counter-o®er with probability q. In the absence of lobby transfers
(T 2






0), the ¯rst legislator g1 can credibly
enforce p2
g;CL. On the other hand, under a closed rule arrangement legislators gd, d > 1,







gd;C, vetoing is not credible. As a consequence, if the lobby can induce the ¯rst
legislator to choose p2
g;CH, then it does not need to pay any positive transfer to convince gd
with d > 1 to pass p2
g;CH. We can now determine the equilibrium transfers inducing the ¯rst
legislator to choose p2
g;CH. Let r be the last round of negotiation between g1 and l. Knowing
that the two players can make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er respectively with probability q and
1 ¡ q, g1 receives q¼ and l receives (1 ¡ q)¼. Moving to round r ¡ 1, the minimum payment
that g1 is willing to accept is q¼ and similarly for l it will be (1 ¡ q)¼. The same is true
moving backward until r = 1, when the lobby l o®ers x2
1 = (p2
g;CH;T 2
lg1 = q¼) and g1 accepts.
On the other hand, for D = n the lobby makes take-it-or-leave-it o®ers x2 = (p2
g;CH;T 2
lgd = 0)
to each legislator gd, d > 1, which will be accepted since v2
gdg(p2
g;CH;T 2
lgd = 0) > v2
gdg(p2
0),
while it o®ers x2 = (p2
g;CH;T 2
lg1 = CH) to legislator g1 who accepts. Moving to t = 1,









¼ , where ¯2













¼ ¸ 0 legislators










¼ < 0 , gd cannot credibly
veto any previously approved policy and therefore ¯
1
gd = 0 8d > 1: At the same time, when
D = n then ¯2
gd = 0 8d > 1, and ¯2
g1 = CH
¼ . Therefore ¯
1
g1 = ± CH
¼ +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ , while ¯
1
gd
8d > 1 is not a®ected. ¥
6.3 Proof of Lemma 5




0), in the absence of lobby transfers the ¯rst
legislator chooses p2
gCL and the successive d > 1 legislators ratify this choice. If amendment
rights are restricted (R = 1), once policy p2
gCL is chosen by the ¯rst legislator, it can be
amended to p2
gCH only if all legislators, including the ¯rst, approve the change. In the last
stage n the legislator gD and the lobby l make take-it-or-leave-it o®ers with probability
q and 1 ¡ q, and the agreement x2
n = (p2
g;CH;T 2
lgD = q¼gD¡1) is reached provided that
q¼gD¡1 ¸ CH, where ¼gD¡1 is the pro¯t available to the lobby after it reached the agreement
with the previous legislator gD¡1. Moving backward, during the ¯rst round of negotiation
between l and gD, l o®ers (p2
gCH;q¼gD¡1) and gD accepts. Similarly, during the ¯rst round
of negotiation between l and any gd, l o®ers (p2
gCH;q¼gd¡1) and gd accepts. Note that after
31each agreement with a legislator d the lobby is left with a pro¯t (1¡q)d¡1¼ that it can share
with the subsequent legislator. Hence, each legislator obtains a share q(1 ¡ q)d¡1. Given
that we have assumed that q(1 ¡ q)D¡1 ¸ CH
¼ then each legislator accepts the agreement
x2 = (p2
g;CH;T 2
lgd = q(1 ¡ q)d¡1¼) because the transfer exceeds his reservation value CH.
When amendment rights are unrestricted (R = 0), if the policy p2
gdCL is chosen by all
legislators d < D, the lobby can still obtain p2
gdCH by just paying ¯2
gD = q¼ to the last
legislator gD. Hence, the lobby will o®er x2
gd = (p2
gdCL;T 2








lgD = q¼) to the last legislator gD















gd ¸ R±q(1 ¡ q)d¡1 + g(d;R)±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ . ¥




¼ ), lemmata 1-3 imply that if the minimum shares required
by a single and by D chambers to choose p1
A;CH are feasible, then p1
A;CH is chosen. On the
other hand, when the minimum shares are not feasible, then p1
















A = ±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ with respectively D and one legislator. First note that from




A, and if ¯
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feasible. Similarly, if the smallest share ¯
1
A is not feasible, the biggest share ¯
1
A;n¡k will also
not be feasible. When on the other hand ¯
1









A the following can be established. If ¯
1
A;n < 1 < ¯
1
A; only the share with









, none of the shares is feasible, while when ¯
1
A < 1 < ¯
1
A;n only the share with a single
legislator is feasible. ¥
6.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose that lemma 5 holds. When R = 1 given that p1
A;CH is the best policy for the
lobby group (i.e. ¯1
l ¸ ±(
alA¡alB














A;CL;:) 8d implies that p1
A;CL is chosen. Since the sum of the minimum shares under
open rule is bigger than under closed rule, then: (a) whenever the the sum of the minimum
shares is not feasible under closed rule, it will also not be feasible under open rule; (b) When
the sum of the minimum share is feasible under closed rule, it may not be feasible under
open rule. From (a) and (b) we conclude that whenever the low cost policy is chosen under
closed rule it will also be chosen under open rule, while the reverse is not true.
Consider now the case where R = 0. The last legislator will exert his amendment right
only if there is a feasible agreement he prefers over the initial agreement reached by the lobby
and the previous legislators. Again, as p1




gd · 1, then from lemma 5 we know that p1
A;CH is chosen by gd with d < D, and is
rati¯ed by the last legislator gD. On the other hand, if the transfer necessary to induce gD
to choose p1
A;CH is not feasible, i.e. if ¯
1
A > 1, then p1
A;CL is chosen. Given that the sum
of the minimum shares is the same under open and closed rule, whenever the sum of the
shares is feasible, the high cost policy is chosen under both open and closed rule. Similarly,
if none of the individual shares is feasible, then the low cost is chosen again under both open
and closed rule. Suppose now that the sum of the equilibrium transfers required by the D
legislators exceeds the lobby pro¯t, ±q + D[
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ ] > 1; but that each individual
transfer is less than the pro¯t, ±q+
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ < 1. In this case, the ¯rst legislator could
choose p1
g;CH if he is o®ered the appropriate transfer. However, given that legislators d > 1
cannot all be o®ered the transfer necessary to pass p1
g;CH, the lobby will not ¯nd it optimal
to carry out the transfer necessary to obtain p1
g1;CH in the ¯rst legislative step, knowing that
this proposal will be overridden by some of the subsequent legislators. As a consequence, the
lobby o®ers (p1
g1;CL;T 1
lg1 = 0) to the ¯rst legislator, who will then decide whether to choose
p1
g1;CL or reject (i.e. keep the status quo p1
0). Since the ¯rst legislator anticipates that
p1




A;CH) 8 ± ¸ ^ ±, then g1 rejects the o®er since since by
assumption 1 ± ¸ ^ ±. In every subsequent negotiation round between the ¯rst legislator and
the lobby, with probability (1 ¡ q) the lobby o®ers again (p1
g1;CL;T 1
lg1 = 0) to the legislator
who rejects, and with probability q the legislators o®ers (p1
g1;CH;T 1
lg1 > 0) to the lobby
who rejects since she cannot a®ord paying the subsequent legislator the minimum transfer
required to pass the high cost policy. Hence, the bargaining between the lobby and the ¯rst
legislator ends with no policy implemented. As a consequence, subsequent legislators without
33proposal power will not be able to amend any proposal, and the mandate terminates with no
policy implemented. The observation that under closed rule, if ±q + D[
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ ] > 1
and ±q +
CH+±(aAA¡aAB)
¼ < 1, then the low cost policy is chosen establishes part (ii) of the
theorem. ¥
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